The disinclination of chain supermarkets to locate or relocate existing stores from inner city impoverished neighborhoods to affluent suburbs is termed 'spatial supermarket redlining'. This study attempts to map and understand the effects of potential spatial supermarket redlining on food access in urban disadvantaged neighborhoods of Hartford, Connecticut. Using a combination of statistical and spatial analysis, we first built a Supermarket Redlining Index (SuRI) from five indicators (sales volume, employee count, accepts food coupons from federally assisted programs, and size and population density of the service area) to rank supermarkets in the order of their importance. Second, to understand the effects of supermarket closures in the inner city, a Supermarket Redlining Impact Model (SuRIM) was built with 11 indicators describing both socioeconomic and food access vulnerabilities. The interaction of these vulnerabilities identified neighborhoods that are maximally impacted by spatial supermarket redlining. Results mapped critical areas in the inner city of Hartford where, if a nearby supermarket closed down or relocated to a suburb with limited mitigation efforts to fill the grocery gap, a large number of minority, poor, and disadvantaged residents would experience difficulties to access healthy food, leading to food insecurity or perhaps a food desert. In conclusion we suggest mitigation efforts to reduce this impact of large supermarket closures.
Introduction
Supermarket redlining is a term used to describe a phenomenon when major chain supermarkets are disinclined to locate their stores in inner cities or low-income neighborhoods and usually relocate existing stores to the suburbs (Eisenhauer 2001) . Compared with the more explicit reasons for familiar types of redlining, such as banking, insurance and housing based on race (Holloway 1998; Holmes 2000; Zenou and Boccard 2000; Squires 2003) , the causality of redlining in retail sectors, including supermarkets, is unclear (D'Rozario and Williams 2005) . This is due primarily to the difficulty of obtaining detailed empirical data on perceived discriminatory practices by retailers based on race, income or other urban obstacles (Eisenhauer 2001; D'Rozario and Williams 2005) . These urban obstacles include lower demand; higher costs of urban land, labor, and utilities; lower profit margins from perishable food items; or risk of theft in inner cities (Bell and Burlin 1993; Eisenhauer 2001) . Coupled with these perceptions, other drivers of supermarket redlining are: the difficulties of finding locations for new supermarkets (typically 50,000 square feet or more) or purchasing multiple adjacent plots; and competition from other investments. For example, a proposal for a minor league baseball stadium threatens plans for a supermarket just north of Downtown Hartford. City officials argue that the approximately $60 million stadium will boost the city's economy.
2002; Morton et al. 2005; Pearson et al. 2005; Zenk et al. 2005; Smoyer-Tomic et al. 2006; Apparicio et al. 2007; McClintock 2008; Raja et al. 2008; Ball et al. 2009; Coveney and O'Dwyer 2009; Sparks et al. 2011) . Similarly there are studies measuring food insecurity (Kendall, Olson, and Frongillo 1996; Carlson et al. 1999; Olson 1999; Alaimo et al. 2001; Hamelin et al. 2002; Vozoris and Tarasuk 2003; Drewnowski 2004; Lopez et al. 2005; Tchumtchoua and Lopez 2005; Food Research and Action Center 2011) ; however, there is to our knowledge no study that focuses, particularly from an empirical approach, on potential spatial supermarket redlining as an early indicator of risk for food deserts and food insecurity. The objectives of this study, therefore, are two-fold: first, to describe an empirical approach to model the impact of spatial supermarket redlining in a Geographic Information Science (GIS) environment, and second, to understand the effects of potential spatial supermarket redlining on food access in disadvantaged neighborhoods of Hartford, Connecticut.
The organization of the article is as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the background literature of supermarket redlining in relation to food deserts and food insecurity. Section 3 describes the underlying conceptual framework for the proposed methodology. The details of the study area, datasets and analytic approach employed in this article are explained in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 follow with results and discussion, respectively. Limitations and future studies are described in Section 7.
Background Literature
The literature on food deserts and food insecurity has increased tremendously in the last decade with several prominent studies, systematic reviews, and case studies (e.g. Avilés-Vázquez and Bussmann 2009; Beaulac et al. 2009; Larson et al. 2009; McKinnon et al. 2009; Walker et al. 2010) . In this section we briefly review these topics, with the primary focus on supermarket redlining.
Food Desert and Food Insecurity
The term food desert describes a phenomenon where affordable and healthy food is difficult to access. The concept of food desert was first used in the UK (Vozoris and Tarasuk 2003) in the 1990s to describe the rapidly decreasing number of grocers in urban, low income neighborhoods after World War II . The term was first used in the context of public sector housing schemes in Scotland in the early 1990s for the Low Income Project Team of the Nutrition Task Force (Beaumont et al. 1995) . Since then, several researchers have attempted to define food deserts from different perspectives. Earlier, Acheson (1998, p. 65) defined it as where "cheap and varied food is only accessible to those who have private transport or are able to pay the cost of public transport". Some of the recent literature has identified socioeconomically disadvantaged neighborhoods with limited or inadequate physical or economic access to healthy and affordable food as food deserts Wrigley et al. 2002 Wrigley et al. , 2003 Smoyer-Tomic et al. 2006; Apparicio et al. 2007; Larsen and Gilliland 2008) . The US Department of Agriculture (USDA; 2015) measures food deserts in the following way: A census tract is considered a food desert if it meets a certain threshold of poverty, and if at least 500 people or one-third of the population reside more than a mile from a large grocery store. Currently the USDA's definition of food desert is the most widely used.
In terms of methodological exploration, researchers have used different techniques to delineate food deserts and there was no clear agreement on what measures were absolutely M Zhang and D Ghosh 3 necessary in identifying food deserts. Initially researchers focused on the number of food stores, ratio of stores per unit area in a neighborhood (Cummins and Macintyre 2002; Morland et al. 2002; Moore and Roux 2006; Block and Kouba 2006) , or the minimum distance to the nearest food stores (Zenk et al. 2005) . Researchers who argued that food deserts did not have clear boundaries began using GIS, remote sensing, and complex modeling techniques to delineate food deserts (Hallett and McDermott 2011; Sparks et al. 2011; Sadler et al. 2011) . Some also used mixed methods to measure accessibility to food stores (Hallett and McDermott 2011) .
"Food insecurity" describes a condition where people have limited access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to meet their daily need for healthy living (Olson 1999; Hamelin et al. 2002; Lopez et al. 2005) . Typically, residents living in a food desert with limited access to healthy food experience issues of food insecurity but the impact is disproportionately higher among vulnerable populations due to lower socioeconomic status, ethnic minority status, old age, and existing negative health outcomes (Morland et al. 2002; Zenk et al. 2005; Raja et al. 2008) . Zenk et al. (2005) found that, even within low-income neighborhoods, residents living in areas with a higher proportion of African-American population had to travel an average 1 to 1.25 miles further to the nearest supermarket than neighborhoods with predominantly white population. White neighborhoods, on the other hand, had almost four times more supermarkets than neighborhoods with a significantly higher black population (Morland et al. 2002) . In terms of prices, the majority of research showed that the poor had to pay more for healthy food (Chung and Myers 1999; Morland et al. 2002; Hendrickson et al. 2006; Jetter and Cassady 2006) . In a case study conducted in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area of Minnesota, Chung and Myers pointed out that big chain supermarkets had much lower prices but were not likely to locate in poor areas (Chung and Myers 1999; Bell and Burlin 1993) . Nonchains and small stores were more likely to be located in impoverished areas, where typically choices for fresh food were limited but with an abundant variety of high-calorie packaged foods at higher prices (Chung and Myers 1999) . Researchers from other countries had different findings. Unlike in the US, study sites in Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Smoyer-Tomic et al. 2006; Apparicio et al. 2007) showed that middle-income communities had the most access to supermarkets and were better served by food stores. Cummins and Macintyre (2002) argued that in the UK, wealthier and poor neighborhoods had no statistically significant differences in access to supermarkets, food prices, or food availability.
Spatial Supermarket Redlining
The concept of retail redlining is less explored in the literature and adaptation of this abstract idea to spatial supermarket redlining is even more limited and perhaps challenging and controversial. Redlining, in general, is a practice in banking and insurance companies when they decide to deny, stop, or charge higher from residents living in marginalized and vulnerable neighborhoods (Kane 1984) . Typically, a red-line will be marked on a map to delineate those specific areas (Sagawa and Segal 1999) . Later D'Rozario and Williams (2005, p. 175) defined retail redlining as "A spatially discriminatory practice among retailers, of not serving certain areas, based on their ethnic-minority composition, rather than on economic criteria, such as the potential profitability of operating in those area". As mentioned earlier, in our study, we further extend the definition of supermarket redlining to spatial supermarket redlining where chain supermarkets either: (1) close down; (2) relocate to suburban areas; or (3) new stores do not open in urban areas not only due to discriminatory reasons but also for a host of other related factors. These factors can be broadly divided into two categories: (1) stereotypes as perceived urban obstacles (Eisenhauer 2001) ; and (2) logistical obstacles related to retail business (Shaffer 2002; Raja et al. 2008) .
Examples of perceived urban obstacles in a city are as follows: (1) Profitability: Supermarket chains often cite low profit margins and higher cost of overheads as barriers to investment in neighborhoods where demand for food items is low due to low-income shoppers, lower volume of sales per customer, and smaller per trip purchases (Eisenhauer 2001; Shaffer 2002) ; (2) Crime: Higher crime rates in low-income urban neighborhoods including employee theft, shoplifting, and dishonesty are also central to the reasons for supermarket closures (Shaffer 2002) . High crime is also related to higher rates of insurance and greater difficulty of getting loan approvals to open new stores; and (3) Cultural Biases: Another important reason why supermarkets avoid inner-city neighborhoods is a perceived anxiety based on cultural biases about the inner city and minorities (Zenk et al. 2005; Raja et al. 2008; Ball et al. 2009; Sugrue 2014) . In Morland et al.'s multi-site study (2002) the racial discrepancy was evident from their findings that predominantly white neighborhoods had four times more supermarkets than black neighborhoods. Mark Green -former New York Consumer Affairs Commissioner (Shaffer 2002, p. 25) -said there is a "knee-jerk premise that blacks are poor and poor people are a poor market". Logistical obstacles, on other hand, include: (1) difficulties of finding locations for new stores, which are typically 50,000 square feet or more; (2) purchasing multiple adjacent plots; (3) higher cost of tax rates, insurance, and utilities (Eisenhauer 2001; Shaffer 2002) ; (4) zoning restrictions and contamination of sites that may require remediation before new stores can be constructed (Shaffer 2002); (5) investors may not understand the diversity of food needs and desires of the racially mixed population; and (6) hindrances from local politics (Shaffer 2002) .
In the US, isolated incidents of supermarket closures or possible supermarket redlining incidents began in 1960s and since then the trend has been on the rise (IFDP 1997). For example, in Boston, Massachusetts, 34 out of 50 big chain supermarkets have closed since the 1970s. In Los Angeles county in California, the number of supermarkets decreased from 1068 in 1970 to 694 in 1990 (Turque 1992) . Safeway, a well-known supermarket chain, closed more than 600 stores in the country from 1978 to 1984 (Eisenhauer 2001) . Many of these stores were the primary or only source of affordable, safe, and acceptable quality of meat and produce in their neighborhoods. In Hartford, 11 out 13 chain supermarkets (almost 85% of the stores) left the city between 1968 to 1984 (Kane 1984) . Incidents of such kind are still happening today (Eisenhauer 2001; Raja et al. 2008; Russell and Heidkamp 2011) .
In recent years, the city of Hartford also experienced several supermarket closures leaving behind unhappy residents and an even wider grocery gap. Market at Hartford 21, an upscale grocery store located in downtown Hartford was only open for six months until it finally closed in September 2011 (Haar 2011). It used to provide various healthy and nutritious ready-to-eat meals, some fresh produce, and even a few organic items. It was becoming "a downtown favorite" as quoted by Tiff (2011) and "it's very nice having a basic grocery store with some basic needs close by" (Jimmy 2011) . Central Supermarket, located in the Farmington Avenue of Hartford, was closed on May 2014 which has been described as "a huge loss to the West End since this area does need a grocery store" (Emily 2012 ). West Hartford's Crown Supermarket also plans to close after more than seven decades of service to the community. A local resident, who had shopped at Crown for her entire life, said, "I don't know what I'll do. I'll be devastated if it closes. I am there once a week for a big order" (Jacobson 2014) .
Incidents of possible supermarket redlining, due to either closing down of existing supermarkets, relocation of supermarkets to the suburbs, lack of investments to construct new ones, or combinations of these scenarios, will disproportionately affect neighborhoods with lowincome, vulnerable residents. It will increase the difficulty of accessibility and availability of healthy food choices. Low-income residents usually do not have enough economic support and/or access to transportation (e.g. personal cars) to travel that "extra" distance to buy healthy food from other stores or from the chain supermarkets in the suburbs. In terms of affordability, low-income consumers often have to pay more for shopping at the local stores where stock is limited and sometimes of poor quality (Kaufman et al. 1997; Morland et al. 2002; Hendrickson et al. 2006; Andreyeva et al. 2008) . Therefore, as stores close, vulnerable urban residents are either traveling farther to purchase nutritious, competitively priced groceries or perhaps paying inflated prices for low quality, processed foods at the corner stores. These situations, affecting both individual health and the health of neighborhoods, would widen the urban grocery gap, increase food insecurity, and perhaps create a food desert.
Conceptual Framework
Supermarket Redlining Index (SuRI) is an index that ranks a chain supermarket based on certain parameters. These parameters are: location of the supermarket, presence of local grocery stores in close proximity, sales volume, employee count, accepts SNAP (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program) and/or WIC (Women, Infants, and Children) coupons, and size and population density of the service area. Detailed specifications of the index with variable definitions are explained in Section 4.3. If a supermarket with high SuRI value closes in an inner city or relocates to a suburb with limited possibilities of a new store being open, the risk of spatial supermarket redlining increases. Given such risk, the Supermarket Redlining Impact Model or SuRIM identifies places or location of neighborhoods where the impact of food access vulnerability will be critical. This model is an extension of Cutter's hazards-of-place model of social vulnerability (Figure 1 ) (Cutter 1996; Cutter et al. 2000 Cutter et al. , 2003 .
According to Cutter's model, risk and mitigation interact to create an initial hazard potential (Cutter et al. 2000 (Cutter et al. , 2003 . In our framework, risk is the likelihood of the occurrence of spatial supermarket redlining, i.e. scenarios where a supermarket closes down and/or relocates to suburban neighborhoods from inner cities. The magnitude of the risk will further depend upon parameters such as: (1) the source of the potential risk (e.g. location of the store); (2) type of the risk (e.g. rank of the store calculated from SuRI); and (3) the impact of the risk (high-consequence if it is the only full-sized supermarket in the neighborhood; lowconsequence if there are other alternatives to fill the grocery gap). The risk of spatial supermarket redlining then interacts with mitigation (e.g. increasing investments to open new stores, increasing stocks of fresh produce in the existing corner stores of the neighborhood, presence of alternate sources for fresh food such as farmers' markets, community gardens) to produce the hazard potential of increasing food insecurity and food deserts. Risks can either be reduced by good mitigation policies or amplified by poor or non-existent mitigation practices. The latter is typical for inner city urban areas where a combination of perceived and logistical obstacles creates disinvestment for new stores and increases the likelihood of food insecurity and food deserts.
The hazard of increasing food security or difficult access to healthy food interacts with the underlying social fabric of the neighborhoods to create social vulnerability. The social fabric (including socio-demographic, economic, and cultural characteristics, awareness, perception, and experiences of the neighborhood residents) affects the overall capacity to respond to food insecurity. For example, if an important supermarket closes down in a neighborhood, the impact would be disproportionately greater among low-income residents with limited access to cars than among those with the resources to travel farther to buy fresh produce. The food access filter includes indicators describing the food environment or foodscapes of the neighborhoods. The indicators are: proximity to other smaller grocery and corner stores, availability of fresh produce in these stores, variety or diversity of food items to satisfy the need for ethnically diverse population, and alternative sources of healthy food at seasonal farmers' markets and community gardens. Similar to social vulnerability, the impact of the hazard will be disproportionally higher for residents with fewer food access indicators to fulfill their grocery needs. Finally, the social and food vulnerability parameters are mutually related and produce the places-of-food vulnerability outcome or, in other words, locations of disadvantaged neighborhoods with maximum food vulnerability. Like Cutter's model, the places-of-food vulnerability has a feedback loop to the initial risk (spatial supermarket redlining) and mitigation (to reduce the risk of spatial supermarket redlining), allowing for enhancement or reduction of both risk and mitigation, which in turn lead to increased or decreased places-of-food vulnerability (Figure 1) (Cutter et al. 2000 (Cutter et al. , 2003 .
To operationalize this conceptual framework, we focused on one input element (risk) and three outcome elements (food access vulnerability, social vulnerability, and place-of-food vulnerability) of the model. SuRI measures the location and magnitude of risk from potential spatial supermarket redlining; the social fabric and food access indicators contribute to social vulnerability and food access vulnerability, respectively. The final outcome of place-of-food vulnerability is the product of social and food access vulnerabilities (Figures 1 and 3) . 
Data
The data for this study was grouped into four categories of retail food stores, relevant GIS shapefiles, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, and travel-time to stores. Food store data were collected from two sources: Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection's (DEEP, 2011) food residual generation mapping project and Esri's Business Analysis (Esri 2011). We followed the criteria used in DEEP's grocery store mapping project to categorize the stores included in our study into three groups: (1) large supermarkets with employee count greater than 15 persons (e.g. Shop and Stop); (2) small supermarkets with employee count between 4-14 persons (e.g. Carlos Supermarket); and (3) convenience stores (e.g. 7-Eleven). Based upon this criterion and within a three-miles buffer around the city of Hartford, we identified 33 large supermarkets, 17 small supermarkets and 73 convenience stores. A three-mile buffer was used for two reasons: first, the residents of Hartford often shop outside their town limits, and second, to minimize errors from edge effects in the subsequent mapping and spatial analysis (Lawson et al. 1999; Laurance 2000; Van Meter et al. 2010; Sadler et al. 2011) . A variety of methods were used to ensure sample completeness, including online yellow pages, business listings, and more importantly "ground-truthing" by driving through neighborhoods to verify store names. Out of the 33 identified large supermarkets within a three-mile buffer around Hartford, nine were located in the city (Figure 2) . For each large supermarket we further obtained the following information: sales volume, employee count, SNAP/WIC coupon status, size of the service area, and population density of the service area.
The GIS shapefiles such as Connecticut's roads were obtained from Esri's Business Analysis dataset, and state, town, and census block-group boundary shapefiles from the Map and Geographic Information Center at University of Connecticut (MAGIC 2013). The socioeconomic and demographic variables were selected from Esri's Business Analysis dataset at the block-group level. The variables selected for the social fabric indicator of the SuRIM model were: percentage of elderly population (65+ years), minority and ethnic population (Black and Asian), diversity of race and ethnicity, population with less than high-school education, renteroccupied household units, unemployment rate, and low-income population. The data on travel time by bus and by car from the population centroids of block-groups to the retail food stores were obtained by using the Google Direction API application. This is a free service provided by Google that calculates the direction (and distance) includingthe time between locations using an HTTP request with a limitation of 2,500 requests per 24-hour period. We will introduce the details of this technique in a future article, currently in preparation. 
Methodology
We first calculated the potential Supermarket Redlining Index (SuRI) at the store level using five variables ( Figure 3A ): sales volume ($), number of employees (count), whether the store accepts SNAP and/or WIC coupons (yes or no, coded as 1 and 0, respectively), size of the service area (number and area of all block-groups that were assigned to the store as the closest supermarket), and population density (number of persons per square mile) of the service area. Sales volume and employee count were the characteristics of the supermarket, which indicated how important that particular supermarket was in serving the community. SNAP-WIC status indicated whether the supermarket accepted coupons from the federally funded food assistance programs designed for low-income households. The service area of the supermarket was determined by using ArcGIS 10.1's Network Analyst functions, where a road-network database and the 'Closest Facility' tool were used to calculate the path from each block-group population centroid to its closest supermarket. The average population density of the service area was then calculated and assigned to each supermarket as the fourth variable. So neighborhoods with sparse supermarkets had a larger service area and thus a larger proportion of urban residents would be at risk if that store closed down. Since the units of these variables were different, each variable was standardized by calculating the ratio of its value to the total value divided by the highest ratio among the block-groups:
where SD(x) is the standardized Redlining Indicator, i is the store, xi is the variable value of each store, Σxi is the sum of each variable, and x x i i ∑ is the ratio of each variable.
The value of each standardized variable ranged between zero to one. To generate an aggregate value for SuRI, standardized values were summed for each supermarket. Due to the lack of prior literature and statistical evidence needed to assign specific weights to calculate the supermarket redlining index, all indicators were given the same importance of equal weights (Wood et al. 2009; Laurance 2000) . The final result was rescaled from 0-10 to be comparable with the values from the SuRIM. These steps are summarized in Table 1 .
Next, we built the Supermarket Redlining Impact Model (SuRIM) at the block-group level using 11 variables ( Figure 3B ). We used seven socioeconomic and demographic variables to describe the social vulnerability (SoVI) component of the SuRIM (See Figure 3B) . For the food access vulnerability (FaVI) component, four variables were included relating to access to healthy food in a situation when the existing supermarket closed down or relocated to the suburbs. In Figure 3B , variables with "+" and "-" represent positive and negative effect on the SuRIM, respectively. The seven socio-economic-demographic variables were: (1) percentage of elderly population (65+ years); (2) minority and ethnic population (Black and Asian); (3) diversity of race and ethnicity; (4) population less than high-school education, (5) renteroccupied household units; (6) unemployment rate; and (7) low income population. All these social fabric variables had positive impact and increased the value of SoVI or, in other words, increased the impact of risk (spatial supermarket redlining) on the hazard of potential food insecurity and food deserts.
For FaVI, the transit-time variables were the additional travel time that the neighborhood residents would have to travel for groceries by public transport or by a car in a situation of potential spatial supermarket redlining. The Google Direction API application was used to calculate these transit time variables (by bus and by car) for each block-group from their centroids to their second closest supermarket minus the transit time to their closest one with the assumption that longer transit time would increase the difficulties of accessing healthy food. Travel time by a bus included walking to a bus stop, time on the bus to the store, and then off the bus and walking to the store. The other two variables described the alternative sources of fresh food in a time of supermarket closures. The variables were the presence and absence of small local supermarkets with employee counts between four and 14 persons and convenience stores. When a supermarket stopped business and the second closest supermarket was too far away, these stores would become the primary or sometimes the only source of groceries. Local small supermarkets might still shelve limited fresh produce but the convenience stores would typically not have fresh food items at all. Small supermarkets were aggregated by block-groups and the count showed the availability of alternative access to limited healthy food (Martin et al. 2014) . We assumed that these stores decreased the impact of the risk of supermarket redlining and used one minus the standardized value when calculating the FaVI. In contrast, convenience stores, typically with no fresh food, would increase food vulnerability. This variable was also aggregated at the block-group level; and higher the count, the higher was the FaVI value indicating increase in the risk of exposure to low nutrition food environments. All of these 11 variables were then standardized using the same method described for the SuRI to create the SoVI (social vulnerability) and the FaVI (food access vulnerability) components. The final outcome of place-food-vulnerability in the SuRIM was the product of FaVI and SoVI (FaVI * SoVI = place-food-vulnerability). Since there were no prior studies that model the impact of supermarket redlining and provide insight in choosing the weights, we assigned equal weights to FaVI and SoVI in calculating the product (Cutter et al. 2003) . Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of SuRI values, which range from 2.1 to 6.2 with a mean value of 4.1. Based on these values, 33 large supermarkets were grouped into three categories of low (SuRI < 3.0), medium (SuRI 3.00 -4.99), and high (SuRI >= 5.00) SuRI values. There were three supermarkets with a service area of four block-groups in the low category, 25 supermarkets with a service area of 192 block-groups in the medium category, and five supermarkets with a service area of 74 block-groups in the high category. Higher SuRI values indicated a higher risk of potential spatial supermarket redlining and the resulting higher hazard of food insecurity and food deserts. Conversely, if a neighborhood store with low SuRI value closed down or relocated to a suburb with limited mitigation efforts to fill the gap, the residents of that neighborhood either had other supermarkets to shop from in the same neighborhood or had access to a car (and or public transportation) to travel to distant stores. Figure 4 is a proportional circle map showing the spatial distribution of stores with SuRI values. Of the 33 large supermarkets, only nine (27%) were located in Hartford and most of them were in the west and south. The supermarket with the highest SuRI value (Bravo Supermarket) was located northwest of Hartford in Albany Ave. Given that there were no other supermarkets or even small stores, this store played an important role as the only provider of fresh food for the residents of the surrounding 27 block-groups in the northwest region of Hartford. A Walmart store, which opened in 2013 at the border of Hartford and West Hartford, had a lower SuRI value, even though it had a higher sales volume and employee count than the other stores. This was due to the presence of other large supermarkets such as Super Stop & Shop and Save-A-Lot in close proximity. Closure of any one of these stores, will therefore, not be a critical loss for the residents. Figure 5 shows the spatial distribution of the two components of SuRIM -food access vulnerability index (FaVI) and social vulnerability index (SoVI) with SuRI values at the census block-group level. Although FaVI did not show strong spatial clustering of either high or low values in the study area, several important findings emerged. First, north Hartford and areas just outside the northern city boundary had higher food access vulnerability due to a lack of large supermarkets, small-sized local stores, or limited public bus services. Second, block-groups with higher FaVI values (5.1-7.6) were located in the downtown, DoNo, and northwest. Third, the supermarket with the highest SuRI value was located in a block-group in DoNo with the highest FaVI, indicating a positive correlation between SuRI (risk) and FaVI (one of the outcome of SuRIM). This supermarket was the store closest to the surrounding 27 block-groups with no other alternative food stores in the vicinity. Overall, the SoVI was higher in Hartford than the surrounding suburbs. Within Hartford, the inner city areas in the central and north-central region had the highest values with 41-96% of black population and 38-50% of low-income population. Block-groups located in the downtown area with higher SoVI also had higher ) and several supermarkets with medium (3.1-5.0) to high (5.1-6.2) values of SuRI. This indicated a stronger positive correlation between SoVI and FaVI, and a weaker positive correlation between SoVI and SuRI. The final outcome of SuRIM or the place-food-vulnerability value (FaVI * SoVI = place-foodvulnerability) is shown along with the SuRI values in Figure 6 . Based on the SuRIM values, the 263 block-groups in the study area were divided into three categories of low (66 block-groups), medium (132 block-groups), and high (65 block-groups) values. Our first observation was that the places or neighborhoods of inner city Hartford suffered a higher impact of place-foodvulnerability (higher SuRIM values) from the risk of potential spatial supermarket redlining Table 3 . In the lower right cell (i.e. high SuRI and high SuRIM values), there are three large supermarkets, whose services are critical for providing fresh and healthy food to the residents of their service area (43 block-groups). Of these three stores, two (Bravo Supermarket) are located in Hartford and one store (ShopRite Supermarket) is located on the western edge of Hartford. The socioeconomic status of the residents (approximately 62,000) living in these 43 block-groups is vulnerable: over half of the population (51%) live in rented properties, 11% have less than high school education, there is a significant black population (69%), average unemployment rate is at 21%, and 26% with low income. Therefore the continued operation of these stores is vital, because if any of these stores close down or relocate to the suburbs without efficient mitigation efforts to close the grocery gap, a significant number of residents who are socioeconomically vulnerable would experience the hazard of food insecurity and food deserts. Residents will either have to drive long distances to another big supermarket or shop at the nearby small local stores, which might not be able to provide fresh fruits and vegetables at affordable prices.
Results

Discussion and Conclusions
We highlight the major findings of our study here. First, the service areas (block-groups) of the supermarkets with higher SuRI values (vital source of food availability) were also the areas with higher impact of place-food-vulnerability (high SuRIM values). These areas were located in the inner city neighborhoods of Hartford, especially in the north, east, central, and southcentral parts. In these neighborhoods, once a nearby supermarket closes (or relocates) and if the mitigation efforts are slow, a large proportion of vulnerable residents might face food insecurity and related negative health outcomes. However, residents who have the resources or the means to travel the extra miles to an alternate supermarket will be less vulnerable to the hazard of food insecurity. The mitigation efforts (e.g. increasing investments to open new stores, increasing stocks of fresh produce in the existing corner stores, encouraging seasonal farmer's markets and community gardens) will affect the severity of the hazard and the final outcome of place-food-vulnerability.
Second, some suburban areas such as northwest of West Hartford, Newington and south of Wethersfield have low SuRI and SuRIM values. This indicates that residents living in these neighborhoods are less vulnerable and the existence of clusters of large supermarkets in close proximity provided choices and more options for buying fresh groceries. These places are typically affluent suburban neighborhoods (only 4% low income population and unemployment rate at 5%) with a predominantly white population (over 80%) and with easy access to a number of large chain supermarkets (average number is four). Third, GIS algorithms, particularly network analyses and travel-time data obtained from the Google Direction API service were appropriate in building the supermarket redlining index (SuRI) and the Supermarket Redlining Impact Model (SuRIM). These analytic approaches aided in illustrating the major findings. The spatial analysis and correlation between SuRI and SurIM identified urban neighborhoods that will face increasing difficulty of accessing healthy and nutritious food if a full-service supermarket closes. It raises concerns about food insecurity and food deserts and urges city officials to consider stronger but feasible mitigation policies to fill the possible grocery gap.
Since it is not always feasible to open a large supermarket in inner cities due to lack of investments, stable markets, and lack of infrastructure related to easy access to highways, large loading docks for large trucks to unload, or distribution networks (Shaffer 2002; Martin et al. 2014) , we suggest other mitigation policies. These suggestions are: (1) investing more in fresh food stocks at the existing local medium to small sized grocery stores and corner stores (Martin et al. 2012) ; and (2) encouraging more urban farms and community gardens to increase options for healthy foods for at least a few months of the year. At present there are seven farmer's seasonal markets of varying sizes and few established community gardens (e.g. KNOX Inc and gardens in the Trinity College). Martin et al. (2014) in their recent study indicated that improvement of quality of food and appearance of the existing smaller local stores can potentially impact the food purchasing decisions of low-income residents in Hartford and mitigate the negative impacts of food insecurity. Many of the store-owners from small and medium-sized markets in Hartford live locally. Therefore, efforts to improve the business infrastructure and sales of these markets will also support the local economy, which is in line with the principles of healthy, sustainable food systems. Studies have shown that store-owners' established friendships between owners and patrons foster store loyalty, especially in neighborhoods without a large supermarket (Bloemer and De Ruyter 1998; Walker et al. 2012) . In comparison, large supermarkets tend to be owned by national or often international companies, whose revenues are not reinvested into the city and whose owners might not be at the same level of enthusiasm to develop friendship with the local patrons.
Limitations and Future Study
The study also had a few limitations. First, due to insufficient literature and this being the first attempt, to our knowledge, to model the impact of spatial supermarket redlining, we used equal weights of FaVI and SoVI in the SuRIM (SuRIM or place-food-vulnerability was the product of FaVI and SoVI) (Cutter et al. 2003) . It is possible that in a different study design, FaVI could be more critical than SoVI or vice versa. Second, we calculated accessibility to grocery stores by car and by public transportation. Due to a high incidence of crime in some parts of the inner city neighborhoods of Hartford, residents are disinclined to walk to services and therefore walking distance is not included. It is however possible that some residents still walk to grocery stores. Third, we included small supermarkets (with employee counts between four and 14) as an alternative source for access to fresh food in a situation of potential spatial supermarket redlining i.e. when supermarket closes or relocates to suburbs. However, some small supermarkets may not stock fresh produce or a variety of food items for the ethnically diverse population of Hartford. The prices of food items in these local stores may also vary significantly. If these small supermarkets have higher prices and a limited variety, will the residents consider these stores as an alternative to large chain supermarkets? If not, then these local supermarkets are not an alternate source for healthy foods and therefore will increase the impact of supermarket redlining instead of decreasing the impact. To answer this question empirically in a future follow-up study, we are currently analyzing data from a survey, which collected detailed data on price, quality, and variety of available food items, and external and internal appearances of the medium-and small-sized grocery stores in Hartford and adjacent towns. Last but not the least, because of the controversial meaning of the word redlining, especially in the retail sector, the authors want to reemphasize two aspects here. First, it should be remembered that in all its variation, retail redlining (including supermarket redlining) is not blatantly practiced based only on race compared with the financial and housing sectors. As discussed in the article, the process of supermarket redlining is complex, with multiple related drivers which may or may not be racially motivated. Second, this study is the first attempt to empirically understand the effects of potential spatial supermarket redlining on food insecurity among vulnerable populations. For that we have built an index and an impact model in a GIS environment, not a predictive model.
